家族企业信任治理的相机选择

Opportunity Selection for Trust Governance of Family Enterprises

华人家族企业的特殊信任是基于忠诚原则上的私人信任。用布赖恩特(Bryant)协调博弈来描述信任,家族主义信任可能形成最优的帕累托协调博弈结果,能较好解决代理中的信任问题,但不能或难以解决随着组织规模或交易的复杂性增加时出现的代理能力不足问题。信任治理的相机选择,则取决于信任在特定文化制度环境下的治理成本结构。必须弱化家族主义信任,加强社会普遍信任环境、制度的建设。

The special trust in Chinese family enterprises is private trust based on the principle of faithfulness. If Bryant coordinating game is used to describe trust, it is possible for familism trust to form Parato optimum to solve the trust problem in agency, but it is difficult to solve the problem of insufficient agent ability with the increasing organizational scale or trade complexity. The opportunity selection for trust governance relies on its governance cost structure in special culture system environment. The familism trust must be weakened and the social widespread trust environment and system construction must be reenforced.