论商业银行信息披露与有效金融监管机制——一个博弈论的观点

On Commercial Bank's Information Disclosure and Effective Finance Regulation Mechanism

本文从博弈论的角度,对商业银行风险信息披露与有效金融监管机制进行了研究,分析了在不对银行进行审计和对银行进行审计两种不同情形下,银行和监管者分别的占优均衡策略。所建立模型对指导监管者如何部署有限的力量有很强的实践指导意义,研究发现:是否需要对银行进行审计应取决于银行所汇报的资本风险率。一个银行宣称自己的风险越低,越应该对其进行审计。

This paper makes a research on the risk information release and effective financial supervision mechanism from the view of game theory. It analyses the strategy of winning advantage for bank and supervisor respectively under two kinds of circumstance in which banks are audited and not audited. The model set in this paper makes great sense of direction for supervisor of how to deploy their limited strength. It is showed that the auditing of bank depends on the capital risk which is released by the bank itself. The low risk the bank releases, the more it should do for auditing.