摘要
假设并购失败对并购者原企业的资产有损害,或产生负协同效应,利用实物期权博弈论方法,研究随机市场下企业并购条件和时机.研究表明,目标企业保证金至少受四种因素影响:一是目标企业本身的特征;二是产业的特征,三是并购者的期望,以及并购失败对并购者原企业资产的损害评估.该损害可能性越大,目标企业要求的最优保证金越低,最优并购触发时间越长.给出两阶段数值模拟例子.模型可用于国有企业产权转让的定价,通过公开拍卖是国企产权转让的最佳选择.
Incorporating a failed acquisition would erode the value of the bidders pre-existing assets, or negative synergies, using a game-theoretic real option approach, this paper presents a dynamic model of acquisitions. Our research indicates that, Ceteris paribus, the reservation premium of target firm is influenced at least by four factors: the characteristics of target firm, the industry's characteristics, the expect synergy gains of bidders and a failed acquisition erode the value of the bidder,s prexisting assets. The bigger the eroding is, the lower of the reservation premium of target firm would be and the longer of the optimal trigger price would be. Two numerical examples are given. The model can be used to price of property right transfer of state-owned enterprises in China. Opening market pricing is the best way for property right transfer of state-owned enterprises.
出处
《数理统计与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第4期643-654,共12页
Journal of Applied Statistics and Management
基金
广东省自然科学基金资助(031635)
关键词
并购的时机与条件
实物期权博弈
负协同效应
timing and conditions of mergers, real options game theory, negative synergies