税收竞争、“退出——呼吁”与企业行为

Tax Competition,Exit-Voice and Entrepreneur Behavior

运用赫希曼的"退出——呼吁"框架来分析我国地方政府间税收竞争下的企业行为,可以发现理性的企业会基于"退出"成本和"呼吁"成本的比较而选择"用脚投票"或"用手投票"。而可置信的"退出"威胁强化了企业的"呼吁"诉求并提高了其成功的可能性。为防止地方政府的机会主义行为,企业必须降低退出成本、提高资本的流动性,以增强自己的"退出"和"呼吁"能力。

With the Exit-Voice analytical frame, we find the entrepreneur under the competition of local government in China will compare the cost of Exit and Voice to determine voting-with-feet or voting-with-hands. In the game with the local government, the creditable Exit intensifies the Voice of entrepreneur and makes it more possibility. To avoid the opportunism behavior of local government, entrepreneurs must reduce the cost of exit and enhance the liquidity of capital.