摘要
基于代理成本理论及自由现金流量假说分析框架,研究了我国上市公司自由现金流量引发的盈余管理行为,并以2004-2006年我国A股上市公司为样本,运用面板数据分析方法进行了相应的实证研究。研究发现,自由现金流的代理成本是激发我国上市公司管理者进行盈余管理的重要原因;企业债务对自由现金流引发的盈余管理行为具有一定的抑制作用,但债务的软约束现象仍然存在。
From the perspective of free cash flow hypothesis and agency cost theory, this article studies the relation between free cash flow and earnings management of Chinese listed companies by using the fixed effect model of panel analysis. The study results show that: the agency cost of free cash flow is one of the motivations for earnings management, and the higher of free cash flow, the more obvious of earnings management; Debt can play control effect in decreasing the level of earnings management.
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
2008年第6期113-117,共5页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics