有限责任效应下的公司负债刚性

On the Rigidity of Corporate Borrowing Under Limited Liability

本文提出并论证了在公司负债的有限责任效应下,财务经理具有只愿意增加负债资本而不愿只增加权益资本的动机,导致实践中公司确定的最优负债水平一般高于传统模型下的负债水平且公司负债融资具有刚性倾向的结论,从另一个角度解释了资本结构理论的相对于权益融资为什么财务经理更偏好干负债筹资的现象。

This paper suggests that, for the limited liability effect of corporate borrowing, the financial manager has the tendency to increasing the equity capital instead of debt if possible. Therefore, the paper concludes that this tendency is the reason why the debt level ascertained in practice is usually higher than that in the classical model, and the company＇s debt financing has the feature of rigidity. Thus from another perspective, the paper explains the phenomenon why the financial manager prefers borrowing to equity financing in the pecking order hypothesis of capital structure theory.