市场环境、民事诉讼与盈余管理

Institutional Environment,Civil Litigation and Earnings Management

以中国上市公司2001—2004年的经验数据为样本,本文对市场环境、民事诉讼和盈余管理之间的关系进行了实证检验。研究发现,公司所在地的市场化程度越高,公司遭受诉讼的概率越大。在诉讼发生当年,上市公司普遍采取了降低盈余的盈余管理行为,这一现象在地方政府控制的上市公司中表现更为明显。此外,我们没有发现,各地区市场环境的差异对上市公司因诉讼诱发的盈余管理行为存在遏制作用。

Based on related literatures, and institution background in China as well as for lawsuits happened in listed firms, in this paper we empirically investigate several issues as follows ：（1）on account of China＇s vast territory, the difference of culture and economic geography, the diversity of local economy, the absence of equilibrium strategy in local economy as a result of central government control, and behavior distortion of central government and local government, China meets absence of equilibrium on local market or institutional environment. Then, which effect does the difference of market environment on lawsuits in the listed firms？ how about the degree of earnings management？ （2）When the firms are confronted with the litigation risk, do they manage their earnings？ To which direction do earnings be managed？ Especially, as to listed firms controlled by different property rights, is there difference of earnings management under the lawsuits？ By analyzing the litigation of listed firms from 2001 to 2004 in china, we find that litigation is affected by both institutional environment and corporate performance. From three different dimensions of market, market modernization, government intervention and law environment are consistent with the incidence of litigation. Furthermore, under the litigation, defendant firms usually undergo earnings management. Meanwhile, defendant SOEs controlled by local government are more likely to commit the earnings management. And, no evidence shows that the development of the institutional environment decreases the degree of earnings management. Possible contributions are showed here： Firstly, as we know, this paper firstly empirically investigates listed firms＇civil lawsuits as a result of debt conflicts, consequently which will be beneficial for us to understand the lawsuits issues in listed firms; Secondly, this paper can help us to farther catch on the earnings management in China. Existing literatures argue that for the sake of regulation request from CSRC, listed firms manage earnings. This paper gives another motivation for the firms earnings management ; Thirdly, when we study the relation between litigation and earnings management, we still research the effect of ultimate controlled stock share holders on the relation, which contribute to the researches on both property right reform and debt governance or monitor in China. Furthermore, the given conclusions in the paper provide reference to legislation on creditor protection.