默许改革的新政治经济学

The Nature of Acquiescence of New-political Economics

本文首先从中国烟草行政垄断体系下"分化"出来的打破中国烟草行政垄断的真实有效的自建系统而又被默许的真实事件出发,提出了一个假说,即中国改革本就是改革者在管理者"睁只眼闭只眼"的管理状态下,所实施的渐进式改革。本文建立了上司领导者-管理者-改革者博弈模型,得到了五个基本命题,分别说明了"睁只眼闭只眼"的重要价值与其在改革进程中的特殊意义,即在权利与责任不对等的情况下,改革探路先锋虽然可能会成为各种歪风邪气最后的"替罪羊",但他们也往往会成为改革的重要推动者。

This paper sets up three models of game theory from a story of anti-monopoly by themselves. In fact, all innovation of China are proposed by innovator and manager, although whose power and rights do not match with responsibility. Hidden-permait rule and law are very important to leave innovator＇s responsibility from manager＇s power and rights. Of course, innovator will be granted the successes of innovation or polished by manager with the risk of situation of China. So, this paper suggests that information of leader should be revealed to all people, government should act by promise, innovate by law, etc.