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跨国公司、产业链与企业的购买势力 被引量:3

On the Relations among Multinational Firm,Industry Chain and Buying Power
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摘要 借助于一个上下游模型,对跨国公司、产业链和企业的购买势力对消费者利益和社会福利的影响进行研究,可以得出如下结论:第一,无论是国资企业还是外资企业先行进入市场,也不管是哪个企业拥有购买势力,企业购买势力的增强都会降低上游企业的利润。第二,无论上下游企业是否组成产业联盟,如果连锁企业是国资企业,那么其购买势力的增加可以提高消费者剩余和社会福利;但是,如果连锁企业是外资企业,那么其购买势力的提高必然会损害消费者利益和社会福利。第三,无论上游企业是否是国资企业,如果下游的国资企业与之缔结产业联盟,都会改善社会福利。 There are several conclusions will be made to study the impact of multinational firm, industry chain and the buying power on consumer surplus and social welfare by using a vertical pricing model as following. Firstly, an enterprise increasing its buying power will harm the benefits of its upper firm no matter domestic firms or foreign finns. Secondly, whether there is an industrial alliance or not, if a domestic firm increases its buying power, then raising the consumer surplus and social welfare, however, if a foreign firm does that, then reducing the consumer surplus and the social welfare. Thirdly, on matter what kind of status of its upger firm, a lower national firm with its upper firm to form an industry chain will improve the social welfare.
出处 《南开学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第4期124-132,共9页 Nankai Journal:Philosophy,Literature and Social Science Edition
基金 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-07-0449) 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地基金资助项目(07JJD790137)
关键词 跨国公司 购买势力 产业链 消费者剩余 社会福利 Mullinafional Firm Buying Power Industry Chain Consumer Surplus Social Welfare
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参考文献14

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共引文献1

同被引文献29

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