企业家与联盟公司在不完全契约下的创新行为博弈

Innovation behavior game between entrepreneurs and alliance enterprises under incomplete contract

文章基于不完全契约和资源基础理论,考察了联盟中企业家和大公司谈判力的动态变化,及其对企业家创新行为的影响。通过建立两阶段博弈模型,研究认为,在契约不完全和知识产权保护力度较弱时,大公司对企业家核心知识资源的窃取是导致企业家谈判力下降的客观原因。这种情况下,企业家可能通过激进的创新活动来获取连续创新能力,从而维持其在再谈判中的地位。但是,这种冒险性的行为会损害新企业的价值。最后,文章对如何实现帕累托改进提出了建议。

Based on the incomplete contract theory and resource based theory, this paper investigates the dynamics of the relative bargaining power between entrepreneurs and incumbents in alliances, which influences entrepreneurs＇ innovative behavior. To construct a two- period model, we find that large finns＇ expropriation of entrepreneurs＇ key knowledge ~ cause entrepreneurs＇ bargaining power decline, when contract is incomplete and intellectual property rights protection is weak. In this case, entrepreneurs would carry out radical innovation activities to gain continuous innovation capability and hold their positions in renegotiafion. However, these risky behaviors may undennine the value of new enterprises. In conclusion, we give some beneficial suggestions for Pareto improvement.