中国金融资源城乡配置差异的政治经济学分析

The Urban-Rural Imbalance of the Distribution of Financial Resources——An Theoretical Frame of Political Economics

中国的金融制度安排是内生于经济转轨时期的政府给予经济改革中的利益受损集团以利益补偿的需要。在这种内生性金融制度安排下,金融资源配置不可避免的具有强烈的政府偏好,导致了金融资源配置的城市化倾向。同时,政府为维系这种金融制度安排所内生出的利率抑制、垄断的银行结构和被抑制的农村金融等特征也必然加剧金融资源配置的城市化倾向和农村金融资源的外流。

The organization of the Chinese banking system is endogenous resulting from the necessity of the government to give certain benefits to groups whose interests were harmed in the process of economic reform as China switches from a command economy to a market economy system so that the distribution of banking resources under this endogenous banking system unavoidably show strong government preferences, resulting in urban areas being highly favored in the distribution of banking resources. In addition, the endogenous interest restrictions under this banking system maintained by the government, monopolistic banking structure and the restricted rural banking industry inevitably exacerbate the imbalance in the distribution of banking resources between urban and rural areas and the drain of banking resources from the rural areas.