摘要
涉及大股东的成本从性质上可以分成两种:大股东的私人成本和公司成本。由于大股东私人成本的存在,造成了事实上的大股东与小股东同股不同权现象。因此大股东有动力寻找控制权收益来补偿其私人成本并获得回报,以实现事实上的同股同权。超控制权收益论对大股东侵害小股东利益问题提出了新的解释,该理论提出股权现金流权和控制权现金流权的获得途径和载体。
The costs concerning the large shareholders consist of the private costs and the company costs. The private costs have led to the result that the large shareholders and the small ones may hold the shame shares but have different rights. Thus, the large shareholders should seek the private benefits of control to cover their private costs and to realize the "the same shares, the same benefits". The theory of Excessive Benefits of Control puts forwards a new explanation of the large shareholder' s expropriation of the small ones. With this, the paper analyzes the cash flow rights of share options and the cash flow rights of control and the relevant issues.
出处
《云南民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第4期87-90,共4页
Journal of Yunnan Minzu University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
大股东侵害
大股东私人成本
超控制权收益
合理控制权收益
expropriation of the large shareholder
the large shareholder's private costs
excessive benefits of control
reasonable private benefits of control