摘要
本文运用博弈论方法分析了建筑业寻租行为的现象和产生的原因,通过对委托方、代理方、建筑业项目承建单位三者之间的纳什均衡模型的分析,给出了建筑业寻租行为的静态均衡和均衡状态下委托人的动态优化选择。分析可见我国建筑市场的现实情况并不处于纳什均衡状态,彻底消灭寻租行为是不现实的,可以通过完善对权力的制衡和监督机制、引进市场监督和强化社会稽查机制、加强市场透明度以降低信息不对称程度等措施减少寻租行为、规范建筑业市场。
The paper mainly analyses the phenomenon and reason of the rent seeking behavior in term of the Game theory in the construction industry, then concludes the dynamic optimization selection of the client under the static equilibrium and dynamic equilibrium through the analysis of Nash equilibrium model among the client, agent and the construction contractor. We can find the construction market is not in state of Nash equilibrium in our country. It is impossible to eliminate the rent seeking behavior. We can decrease the rent seeking behavior and regulate the construction market through perfecting supervision and balance mechanism to the authority, introducing the market superintending and strengthening society investigation mechanism, reinforcing the market transparency to relieve the information asymmetry level.
出处
《北京交通大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2008年第3期80-84,共5页
Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
建筑业
寻租
博弈
纳什均衡
construction industry
rent seeking
Game
Nash equilibrium