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湖南上市公司债务治理、代理成本与绩效的实证研究 被引量:1

Empirical Research on Debt Governance,Agency Cost and Performance of Listed Companies in Hunan
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摘要 债务治理可以抑制代理成本,形成治理效应,但治理效应形成可观测的治理绩效以及最终形成可观测的债务综合绩效取决于治理效应传递机制是否有效。经过对湖南上市公司2003-2006年共152个观测值进行实证研究后发现,湖南上市公司负债程度与债务治理效应(代理成本的抑制作用)之间呈倒U型相关,与债务治理绩效无显著相关,而与债务综合绩效呈U型相关。这一结果表明湖南上市公司债务治理效应传递机制有效性不高。 Debt governance can help form governance effect by restraining agency costs. It is the effectiveness of transfer system that determines governance effect to transfer to corporation perfor-mance and then measurable debt performance. Making use of 152 samples which consists of panel data (2003-2006) from 48 listed companies in Hunan, this paper indicates the extent of liabilities is inverted U-related with debt governance effect. And it is not significant related with debt governance performance while is U form related with debt performance. The finding means the effect of debt gover-nance of Hunan companies is negative.
作者 李世辉 李进
机构地区 中南大学商学院
出处 《财经理论与实践》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第4期77-81,共5页 The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
关键词 债务治理 代理成本 治理效应 财务绩效 Debt governance Agency cost Governance effect Financial performance
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