内部监督、监管替代与银行价值

Internal Monitoring,Supervision Substitution and Bank Value

本文以银行内部监督为例,通过建立一个简单模型并进行实证检验,深入研究了监管对内部治理机制的替代关系及其对银行价值的影响。研究结果表明,监管确实改变了银行内部监督机制,产生了监管替代。监管对内部监督进而对银行价值的影响较为复杂,不同监管措施的影响存在差异。事前严格的监管降低了内部监督强度,对银行价值产生负面影响;事中监管监督的影响取决于对内部监督的替代程度,当替代效应大时会降低银行价值,反之,当替代效应小时则会提高银行价值。监管替代的存在表明良好的银行公司治理有赖于恰当的监管政策。为减少监管过度替代带来的问题,我国现行由监管部门主导银行改革的监管政策需要作出调整。

By building a simple model and doing empirical tests, the paper analyzes substituting effect and its influence on bank value. The conclusions show that supervision indeed changes the mechanism of internal monitoring through substitution effect. The impact of supervision on bank value is mixed, while there are differences between supervision measures. Ex-supervision weakens internal monitoring and has negative impact on bank value, while on-site supervision＇ s impact is determined by the extent of substitution effect. When substitution effect is large, it will reduce bank value. Otherwise it will improve bank value. This indicates that good bank corporate governance relies on proper supervision policy. In order to reduce the over-substitution problem of our bank corporate governance, the present supervision model that regulator dominants bank reform should be changed.