摘要
This paper first introduces various theories of eliminativism in the philosophy of mind.It then presents and analyzes Richard Rorty’s disappearance form of the identity theory as a specific version of eliminative materialism.The author considers two intuitive objections to Rorty’s theory and then constructs two thought experiments: the case of public pain and the case of twin earth pain in order to defend,elaborate,and develop Rorty’s viewpoint and position.Finally the author shows what morals we can draw from Rorty’s methodology and insight and how the two thought experiments given in this paper can shed light on the debate between materialism and anti-materialism in the philosophy of mind.
This paper first introduces various theories of eliminativism in the philosophy of mind.It then presents and analyzes Richard Rorty's disappearance form of the identity theory as a specific version of eliminative materialism.The author considers two intuitive objections to Rorty's theory and then constructs two thought experiments: the case of public pain and the case of twin earth pain in order to defend,elaborate,and develop Rorty's viewpoint and position.Finally the author shows what morals we can draw from Rorty's methodology and insight and how the two thought experiments given in this paper can shed light on the debate between materialism and anti-materialism in the philosophy of mind.
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第7期65-74,共10页
Philosophical Research
