信息产品垄断厂商定制策略研究

Study of information goods monopolist's customization decisions

由于信息产品本身所具有的特点和消费者追求个性化消费,信息产品生产商开始关注消费者定制生产模式.考虑信息产品定制过程中的误差所造成的定制交易不确定现象,给出了垄断厂商的利润最大化模型,并深入讨论了厂商如何通过收取定金规避定制交易不确定所带来的风险.研究结果表明,在市场未完全覆盖条件下,厂商通过提高标准产品价格鼓励消费者进行定制消费,定制能够增加总体利润;信息产品定制交易系数位于不同的区间时,厂商收取的边际定金有不同的增减性;消费者对产品差异越敏感,垄断厂商向消费者所收取的边际定金越小.

Just beause of characterizes of information goods and personality of consumer＇ s behavior, the information goods producer is beginning to pay attention to customization production. Considering the trade uncertainty originated from errors of communication between the producer and consumer during customization process, this paper studies how to decision when information producer provide both standard product and customized product, and how to avoid the uncertainty originated from customization communication errors. The results show that under the market incomplete covered condition, the monopolist can increase his profits by adopting customization. Despite the uncertainty of customization goods＇ quality, the monopolist can collect earnests to evade such uncertain risk and the earnest decreases or increases in different uncertain level.