期刊文献+

累计创新中的“反公共地悲剧”研究 被引量:1

下载PDF
导出
摘要 累积创新中后续创新需以先导创新为基础,在先导创新拥有多个权利主体的情况下,有可能出现"反公共地悲剧"现象。后续创新者利用先导创新成果需要向先导创新者支付创新许可费,门槛费、利润分享和数量提成是三种常见的许可协议方式。分析表明三者对后续创新的影响是不同的。如果先导创新者数量明确,仅数量提成方式会导致累积创新中的"反公共地悲剧"。如果先导创新者的数量不明确,先导创新者的序贯出现将使后续创新者落入"公共地陷阱",削弱其创新动机,同样可导致"反公共地悲剧"。
作者 闫威 陈林波
出处 《科技管理研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第6期16-18,27,共4页 Science and Technology Management Research
  • 相关文献

参考文献9

二级参考文献14

  • 1[1]Bessen J. and E. Maskin, 2000, "Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation," MIT, mimeo.
  • 2[2]Cheung, S., 1979, "Property Rights and Inventions, "University of Washington Institute for Economic Research, Discussion paper, No.79-11.
  • 3[3]Hardin, G., 1968, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science, 162, pp. 1243-48.
  • 4[4]Heller, M. and R. Eisenberg, 1998, "Can Patents Deter Innovateon? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research," Science, 280, pp. 698-701.
  • 5[5]Dasgupta, P. and J. Stiglitz, 1980a, "Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity," Economic
  • 6[6]Journal, 90, pp. 266-293.
  • 7[7]Dasgupta P. and J. Stiglitz, 1980b, "Uncertainty, Industrial Structure and the Speed of R&D," Bell Journal of Economics, 11, pp. 1-28.
  • 8[8]Loury, G., 1979, "Market Structure and Innovation," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93, pp. 395-410.
  • 9[9]Lee, T. and L. Wilde, 1980, "Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94, pp.429-436.
  • 10[10]Shapiro, C., 2001, "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting," in Adam Jaffe, Joshua Lerner, and Scott Stern eds, Innovation Policy and the Economy, Vol. 1, MIT press.

共引文献71

同被引文献8

引证文献1

二级引证文献7

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部