农村政策为什么在执行中容易走样

Why Rural Policies Are Easily Changed in Implementation

本文从信息和激励的角度,解释中央的农村政策为什么在执行中容易走样。政策目标难以度量、公共部门激励不足、政策不完备等,给了执行者扭曲政策、谋取个人或集团利益的机会。在中央集权体制下,由于失去了投票选举和分权制衡两大强有力的监督工具,作为代理人的政策执行者及监管者更容易出现信息隐瞒、监督者榨取、政策套利、代理人之间合谋、委托人之间相互推诿和拆台等道德风险问题。

This paper explains why rural policies issued by the central government are easily changed in implementation from the perspective of information and incentive. The difficulty in measuring effects of policy, lack of incentive in public sector, and incompleteness of policy give executors chances to distort rural policies for their own or group interests. In the system of political centralization, there are no voting, no checks and balance. When these two powerful policing tools are missing, moral hazards by executors and monitors, such as hiding information, squeezing information rent, policy arbitrage, collusion between executor and monitor, buck-passing, and discordance easily happen.