组合采购拍卖的多因素投标机制设计研究

Procurement Combinatorial Auction Mechanism Design Based on Multi-attributes Bidding

采购组合拍卖指的是通过组合拍卖的方式进行多物品采购。在进行采购组合拍卖时,拍卖的机制设计不仅要考虑供应商——投标者的利益,同时还要考虑采购商——拍卖者的利益,也即拍卖的分配效率问题。然而,由于产品的成本函数往往是投标者的私有信息,投标者并不愿意暴露该信息,该私有信息的存在影响着机制实现分配效率。考虑到该问题,本文设计了一种让投标者直接对物品组合进行"价格-质量"投标的多因素采购组合拍卖机制(MA-VCG-PQ),该机制具有分配有效、激励相容、个体理性和预算平衡的良好性质,同时避免了供应商成本函数信息的曝露。

Procurement combinatorial auction means procurement for various items in enterprises or government which is implemented by combinatorial auctions. One of the most important characteristic of mechanism design for procurement combinatorial auction is the system allocation efficiency, which is meaningful and unique in procurement combinatorial auctions. The mechanism should not only consider suppliers -bidders＇ profits, but also the buyer- auctioneer＇s profit. However, the cost function is usually the bidder＇s private information, this information influences the allocation efficiency. Considering this, we propose MA - VCG - PQ, an efficient multi - attributes procurement combinatorial auction, in which agents could bid for set of items with direct price - quality bid, without eliciting cost function information. Besides incentive compatible, the mechanism also holds the budget balance and individual rationality.