信任、经理人激励与家族企业治理

Trust,Manager's Incentives and Clannish Enterprise's Governance

信任治理是解决"家族主义困境"的重要方式.它通过使家族提供的包含信任信息的工作条件符合经理人预期的形式来激励经理人.家族根据对经理人的信任水平来调整相应的激励机制.不同的激励机制反映为不同的家族企业治理模式.来自对沪市家族上市企业的实证研究表明:采用要素使用权契约激励机制的治理模式是最有效率的.在相似的要素使用权契约水平下,家族控制要比家族大规模放权要更有效率,这说明我国家族企业的信任治理还不成熟.

Trust governance is an effective way to help clannish enterpriese out of the familism dilemma, which inspires managers by paralleling working condition including trust information to managers＇ expectation. The incentive mechanism is adjusted by the family according to how much they trust in the manager, and different mechanism results in different governance patterns of clannish enterprises. Empirical research on the listed family enterprises in Shanghai indicates that factor-use-right contract drive mechanism is the most efficient governance pattern. On a factor-use-right contract level with releasing authority on a large scale, keeping the enterprise under the family＇s control seems more efficient, which reveals the immaturity of the trust governance of China＇s family enterprises.