摘要
风险投资有限合伙协议在内容的安排上往往是十分松散的,从一个法律人的角度看,我们起初担心如此灵活的安排会损害风险投资有限合伙中有限合伙人的利益。然而事实证明,外部投资人是乐于接受这种松散而偏颇的协议安排的。笔者认为,其原因就在于风险投资行业信誉性的束缚机制取代了法律的约束机制。有限合伙协议作为风险投资有限合伙关系的基础是合同自治原则的典型体现;风险投资的信誉性比法律更能有效规避有限合伙人的风险,即风险投资的信誉性替代了法律,成为了保护有限合伙人利益的有效机制,由此才使得有限合伙协议可以最大限度地体现当事人订立合同时的自由意志。
Terms in venture capital limited partnership agreement seem very flexible. As a legal practicer, at the beginning, we are very worried that such arrangement might infringe the interests of limited partners. However, the fact proves that the ground that limited partners accept such arrangement is that reputation,instead of legal institution, is a valid mechanism to safeguard the benefit of limited partners. The paper includes five parts, in which the first part introduces the venture capital limited partnership agreement;the second part shows that such an agreement is the embodiment of contractarianism;the third part discusses the interest conflicts between general partners and limited partners;and the forth part shows that reputation, instead of legal institution, is a'valid mechanism to safeguard the benefit of limited partners. Finally, a conclusion is made.
出处
《北华大学学报(社会科学版)》
2008年第4期28-32,共5页
Journal of Beihua University(Social Sciences)
关键词
风险投资
信誉
自治
Venture capital
Reputation
Contractarianism