审计师聘用中的敲竹杠行为研究

Research on Hold-up Behavior in Auditor Engagement

由于审计契约的不完全性和审计师对客户进行首次审计时的专用性投资,客户的经理层存在激励对审计师敲竹杠。由此可能产生两种损害审计质量的经济后果:审计师与经理层合谋或者减少首次审计专用性投资。治理审计师聘用中敲竹杠行为可采取四方面措施:中注协建立上市公司审计工作底稿数据库帮助审计师降低专用性投资水平;改变审计收费模式;对敲竹杠和合谋的行为进行严厉处罚;改革审计师的聘任机制。

The incompletion of audit contract and auditors＇ special investment in the initial auditing breed an incentive that clients＇ managers hold up auditors. As a result, two economic consequences damaging auditing quality may occur, which are the collusion of managers with auditors and the deliberate decrease in the special investment of initial auditing. To tackle the hold - up behavior in auditor engagement, measures can be adopted from four aspects： the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants establishing an audit working paper database for listed companies to help auditors reduce special investment; changing auditing charge models; severely punishing hold- up and conspiracy behavior;reforming auditor employment mechanism.