中国民营上市公司高管的政府背景与公司价值

Political Connection and Market Valuation:Evidence from China Individual-controlled Listed Firms

本文以1999—2004年沪深两市1046个A股民营上市公司样本为研究对象,实证研究了高管的政府背景与公司价值间的关系。我们的研究发现,高管具有政府背景整体上并没有影响公司价值,但区分不同政府背景后,高管的地方政府背景对公司价值的正面影响要显著大于中央政府背景。而考虑不同地区的政府干预程度后,高管的地方政府任职背景在政府干预比较厉害的地区能增加公司价值。政府干预越强烈,这种正面影响也越强烈。另外,还发现这种正面影响与高管地方政府背景的贷款融资便利性有关。

This study purposes to examine the link between political connection and market valuation in China＇s listed firms. Using 1,046 samples of individual-controlled firms during 1999--2004, we find that firms having local government political connections have a higher market valuation than those having central government political connections, while there is no significant relationship between political connection and market valuation. Moreover, our result shows that in provinces with higher governmental intervention on the economics sectors, local government political connections have positive effect on the market value. The more severe the local governments＇ intervention, the more positive effect of the local government connection on the firm value. We also show evidences that this local government political connection is helpful to get short-term loans from banks.