从博弈论角度分析招投标对建筑企业低利润率的影响

To Analye on Influence of Bidding for Construction Industry's Low Profit Rate Based on the Game Theory View

中国建筑企业的产值增加而利润率走低是一个不争的事实,而招投标中各方的博弈是导致这种现象的一个很重要的原因。通过建立不完全信息静态博弈模型来分析招标方、投标企业和监督机构三者之间的博弈行为,得出均衡:在招标方低价中标原则下,投标企业会通过降低自己的利润空间来获得低价竞标的优势。这就带来了许多不良后果。为了消除不良后果,提出采用固定成本加酬金的招标方式,由此形成了新的规范的均衡:招标方得到工期和质量保证,投标企业得到理想的利润,从而实现了招投标双方的共赢。

It＇s beyond argument that while the value of output of construction industry in China is increasing, the profit rate is going down. Among many reasons, bidding is a major cause due to fierce competition. It establishes a static game model of uncompleted information among the owner bidder and supervisory institution to analyze their respective strategies and comes to a balance which means that the bidder have to minimize their profit for achieving the contract under the owner＇s lowest bid principle . But this leads to some bad results . In order to eliminate them, it still puts forward a new bidding style with fixed project cost and variable rewards. In this way, we can strike a win-win balance that the owner get assured project schedule and meanwhile the bidder get desired profit.