从委托代理角度看价值评估行业监管失效问题

The Invalidation of Valuation Industry Supervision from the Perspective of Principal-Agent Theory

随着我国资本证券市场的迅速发展,资产重组、股权分置改革、实物期权等运作都需要由价值评估中介机构完成,价值评估行业已成为我国经济生活中不可或缺的重要组成部分。而近年来一系列的虚假评估事件,使人们对资产评估师的职业道德产生了怀疑,也使价值评估行业的公信力降到了前所未有的最低点。除了评估师自身存在的问题外,外部行业监管失效也是重要原因之一。文中从委托代理理论入手,对国内价值评估行业监管失效的现象进行了深入的分析,并针对存在的问题提出了改进的建议。

With the rapid development of China＇s capital stock market, such operations like asset reorganization, non-tradable shares reform, and real option are performed by valuation agency. Therefore, valuation industry has become an indispensable and important part in our country＇s economy. However, a series of false evaluation events has occurred in recent years. People throw doubt upon the professional ethics of the professional Certified Public Valuer. Moreover, the public trust towards this field decreased to the unprecedented lowest point. Besides the existing problems of the public valuer, the invalidation of external supervision in valuation industry is also an important reason. Grounded on the theory of principal-agency, this thesis analyzes the phenomena of the invalidation supervision in China＇s valuation industry. Some suggestions of China＇s valuation industry supervision also put forward.