基于回购契约的供应链协调与风险分担分析

Analysis on cordination and risk sharing of supply chain based on buy back contract

利用Stackelberg主从博弈方法研究在供应商和销售商的边际成本都随产量递增的情况下,供应链的协调问题和风险分担问题.研究结果表明回购契约可以协调供应链.供应商的最优回购契约是:供应商允许销售商对剩余订货全部按批发价退货,供应商采用边际成本加成定价的方式来确定批发价,加成比例由市场需求的满足率决定;节点企业分担的风险之比等于两企业在供应链最优订货量处的边际成本之比.

The supply chain coordination and risk sharing problems are researched under the condition of the supplier＇s and the retailer＇s marginal cost functions increasing with outputs with Stackelberg game model. The result shows that the supply chain can be coordinated by the buy back contract. The supplier buys back all the residual order of the retailer＇s at the wholesale price, and determines the wholesale price in the method of marginal cost-plus pricing. The cost-plus ratio is determined by the meeting rate of the market demand. In the supplier＇s optimal contract, the risk ratio of the two firms equals their marginal cost ratio at the supply chain＇s optimal order.