摘要
不同类型的研发外包契约在处理事前信息不对称、事后信息不对称、再谈判摩擦以及项目不确定性等方面的效率是有差异的。具体说来,固定支付契约可以筛选出有效率的潜在承包者、可以提高承包者响应再谈判邀请的概率、可以促使承包者在执行项目过程中节约成本,但是无法为重要项目提供资金保障;相应地,成本附加契约可以为重要项目实施提供充足的资金保障,但是可能导致潜在承包者实施逆向选择行为、可能导致承包者因无利可图从而对再谈判缺乏兴趣、可能导致最终研发预算面临软约束。同时,研发外包契约类型选择也应考虑项目投资规模和预期成果价值、潜在承包者人数等因素。
The paper argues that different types of contracts for R&D outsoureing are effective differently in dealing with ex ante asymmetric information, ex post asymmetric information, renegotiation friction and project uncertainty. Fixed - Price contracts can pick out potential more e, fificient sellers and can improve the possibility of accepting the invitation of renegotiation and make sellers reduce costs during implementation, but possibly can ' t fund important projects in time. Adversely, cost - plus contracts can ensure the projects have full budget, but perhaps induces adverse selection and decreases sellers' interests to engage in renegotiation and results in soft budget. In addition, project investment amounts, expecting results and potential number of sellers can' t be neglected during contract - type selection.
出处
《科学管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第4期34-37,共4页
Scientific Management Research
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70502010)
关键词
研发外包
固定支付契约
成本附加契约
R&D outsourcing
Fixed - Price contracts
Cost - plus contracts