摘要
本产权保护可以区分为公共形态的产权保护与私有形态的产权保护两种,本文通过建立包括异质民众、掠夺者、私有形态产权保护提供者以及国家四个行为主体的模型,分析了产权这一特性所导致的系列福利后果,继而得出一系列有意义的命题:其一,私有形态产权保护对于未受保护群体具有负的外部性;其二,其覆盖范围及提供者效用取决于这种增量保护的价值;其三,存在着国家为了谋求租金收入而策略性地减少公共形态产权保护供给的可能。
Property rights protection can be divided into two categories, public form and private form.This paper builds a model which includes heterogeneous plebs, predator, provider of the private form of property rights protection and the state to analyze this characteristic of property rights.Through the analysis of the model, we have got some interesting results: ( 1 ) Private form of property rights protection has negative spillover effects on the groups which have not purchase property rights protection; ( 2 ) Both the scope of private form of property rights pro- tection and the utility of the provider depend on the incremental value; ( 3 ) The state may stra- tegically decrease the provide the public form of property rights protection in order to get the rents from the private form of property rights protection.
出处
《南开经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第2期79-92,104,共15页
Nankai Economic Studies
关键词
产权保护
私有形态的产权保护
公共形态的产权保护
不对称产权保护
Property Rights Protection
Private Form of Property Rights Protection
Public Form of Property Rights Protection
Asymmetric Property Rights Protection