摘要
本文研究了在企业投资项目审批程序中,企业审批机构的收益模式,审批权的分割程度以及不同的信息结构如何影响"反公共地悲剧"的发生和经济效率。本文发现,如果不允许谈判且审批机构的收益仅来自固定的审批费份额,则较高的审批权分割程度容易导致反公共地悲剧。在对称信息条件下,企业与每个审批机构的纳什合作谈判可以减轻甚至杜绝反公共地悲剧的发生,但审批权的分割程度以及企业和审批机构的相对谈判力会影响总剩余在企业和机构间的分配:审批权分割程度越高,企业获得的剩余越少。然后在不对称信息条件下,谈判定价也不能避免净效率损失,而且此时降低审批权分割程度反而可能会进一步增加经济效率损失。
It is investigated how bureaucracies＇ different revenue channels, fragmentation of licensing right and different information structure affect the occurrence of ＂the tragedy of the anti- commons＂ and economic efficiency. As found, if the only revenue channel of bureaucracies is obtaining a fixed share of the total licensing fee without bargaining, then the high fragmentation of licensing right can easily cause the tragedy of the anti-commons. However, under symmetric information, if the enterprise can compensate each bureaucracy respectively by Nash bargaining, then the tragedy of the anti-commons can be ameliorated or even avoided, but the extent of fragmentation and the relative bargaining power will influence the distribution of total surplus between enterprise and bureaucracies： the higher is the fragmentation, the lower surplus the enterprise gets. However, if the information is asymmetric, then the bargaining can not completely avoid the net efficiency loss. In this case, the decrease in the extent of fragmentation may contrarily reduce the economic efficiency further.
出处
《南开经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第2期93-104,共12页
Nankai Economic Studies
