职业经理人会关注他们的市场声誉吗--来自中国资本市场舞弊行为的经验透视

Do Professional Managers Concern Their Market Reputation——An Evidence from Fraud Behaviors in China’s Securities Market

本文构建了一个经理人声誉与舞弊行为的关系模型,从公司舞弊行为角度透视经理人对自身市场声誉的关注情况。模型预测,基于职业生涯利益的考量,越年轻、合同报酬越高、外部招聘的经理人越注重职业声誉,其所在上市公司越不易发生舞弊。以被证监会处罚的A股上市公司为对象的检验表明:目前我国经理人市场并没有为年轻经理人向市场显示其优秀经营才能和抑制舞弊提供足够激励;外部招聘的经理人并不具备更强经营能力,其所在上市公司舞弊可能性不一定会降低;经理人合同报酬与舞弊显著负相关,但考虑经理人市场竞争后其抑制舞弊的作用降低;经理人市场竞争与经理人合同报酬是两种相互替代的经理人市场治理机制。

This paper develops a game theory model to analyze whether professional managers concern their market reputation based on the perspective of corporate fraud behaviors. The conclusions the model predicts are that, because of career concerns, manager will pay more attention to his/her market reputation when his/her contract pecuniary is higher, he/she is younger or recruited externally, and thus the likelihood of corporate fraud will lower. Using the sample of Chinese A-share listed companies that were punished by CSRC, this paper empirically finds that： ①Managerial labor market can＇t incentive younger managers to show their high management capacity and prevent fraud; ②The managers recruited from outside of enterprise didn＇t possess high management capacity, and the probability of fraud in the listed companies those they serve is not lower; ③Though managerial contract pecuniary is significantly negative associate to the probability of fraud, its statistical significance become lower when we consider managerial labor market competition; ④Managerial labor market competition is a manager market governance mechanism substituted of managerial contract pecuniary.