固定支付模式下技术创新的博弈分析

Game Analysis on Technological Innovation under Fixed Payment Pattern

本文构建了企业与科研单位合作技术创新的收益函数和博弈模型,并与企业自主创新的情况对比。研究结果表明,技术创新的技术含量并非越高越好,而是存在最佳产品技术含量;在同等条件下,企业自主技术创新的效益要大于企业与科研单位合作技术创新的效益。因此,一方面,企业不应盲目加大创新投入;另一方面,政府应降低对科研单位的投入,提高企业的研发能力。最后,对模型进行了实例研究。

This paper constructes the income function and the game model based on cooperative technological innovation of enterprises and scientific research units,and contrasts the cooperative technological innovation of enterprises and scientific research units with the independent technological innovation of enterprises. The result shows that, there exists the best technological content of production in technological innovation rather than the technological content of production is the higher the better ; the benefit of technological innovation based on enterprises＇ independent technological innovation is higher than that based on the cooperative technological innovation of enterprises and scientific research units. Therefore, enterprises should not blindly expand innovation investment, and government should reduce the input for scientific research units and enhance the capability of research and development of enterprises. Finally,a case study is made to verify this model,