摘要
发展绿色经济,既是中国经济社会可持续发展的必然选择,也是应对未来可能日益增多的国际环境问题矛盾的迫切要求。政府促进绿色经济政策工具可分为管制性和经济引导性两类。管制性政策的弹性小,有效成本巨大,而经济引导性能够促进关联者自发行动,是主要考虑对象。目前我国绿色经济政策的参数多为主观判断,缺乏定量化手段。以Stackelberg模型作为理论基础来构建博弈模型,可以分析绿色产业链条的责任者和辅助者与政府政策之间的互动,得出最优征罚率与最优补贴率,从而为制定促进绿色经济发展的最优经济引导性政策提供建议。
Green economy, is the natural choice of Chinese economic social sustainable development, and is the urgent need to deal with the international environmental issues. The ways of government to promote green economy are control policy and economic blandishment policy, The flexibility of control policy is small and the cost-effective is great and the economic blandishment policy can promote related party to spontaneous actions.At present, China's green economy policy usually are subjective judgement and is lack of quantitative means. The game theoretical model based on the model of Stackelberg, analyzes the interaction between responsibility and supporting in the green industry chain to get the optimal rate of levy fine and the rate of optimal fringe benefits so as to offer suggestions for laying down optimal economic blandishment policy to promote the development of green economy.
出处
《经济地理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第4期598-602,共5页
Economic Geography
基金
湖南省社会科学院课(编号:0708B2292)资助
关键词
绿色经济
征费与补贴
经济引导性政策
博弈模型
green economy
fee and subsidies
economic blandishment policy
game theoretical model