网络交易中“柠檬市场”分析——理论模型与实践意义被引量：4

Analysis of "Lemons Market" in the E-Commerce Transactions:Theoretical Model and Practice

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摘要当人们对网络带来的种种便利和高效率而欢欣鼓舞时,却又不得不同时面对着这样一个事实:虽然互联网的广泛应用在很大程度上改善了信息不对称的情况,但互联网上的"柠檬"问题因为网络的虚拟性实际上是被强化了。这些问题的存在制约着我国电子商务的发展,需要人们进行深入的探讨。通过构建电子商务市场上的"柠檬"模型,并依据该模型对电子商务市场中"柠檬"问题的运行机理进行了分析。最后,就中国电子商务市场中"柠檬"问题的特殊表现和解决途径进行了探讨。 When we are enjoying the convenience and high efficiency of the internet, we are up against a predicament that the ＂lemon＂ problem is getting worse because of the virtual nature of internet although the internet has greatly improved information asymmetry. This issue has restricted the development of e - commerce in China. Based on the ＂lemon＂ principle put forward by American economist George Akerlof, this paper constructs a ＂lemon＂ model in the E-commerce market. With the aid of the model, this paper analyzes the business efficiency in the E-commerce market and discusses possible development about the matter in the future.

作者潘勇

机构地区河南财经学院网络经济与IT战略研究所

出处《财贸研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第4期68-73,共6页 Finance and Trade Research

基金教育部人文社会科学研究2007年度规划基金项目"中国电子商务市场中的‘柠檬’问题:本土特征形成机理与管理策略研究"(项目批准号:07JA630021)阶段性成果

关键词在线产品信息的非对称性 “柠檬”问题 online products information asymmetry ＂lemon＂ problem

分类号 F713.36 [经济管理—产业经济]

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参考文献11

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二级参考文献18

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