上市公司预算松弛的影响因素及其对公司业绩的影响

The Influence Factors and Performance Consequence of Budget Slack for Listed Enterprises in China

现有的众多经验研究证明,组织中的预算松弛是十分普遍的,而代理理论与权变理论是有效解释预算松弛的重要理论。我们首次采用上市公司的公开数据,研究上市公司预算松弛的影响因素及其对公司业绩的影响。实证结果表明:1、股权性质、股权结构和企业规模是解释预算松弛的重要变量。这说明,代理理论和政府干预比权变理论更适合解释我国上市公司的预算松弛行为。2、一个严紧的预算目标有助于提高企业的ROA和ROE,但并未提高企业的主业盈利能力,而企业的盈余管理水平与预算松弛程度呈弱的负相关。所以,严紧的预算并未产生有效的激励作用,而只是增强了经理人的盈余管理动机。

Some subsistent empirical researches indicate that budget slack is prevalent in organizations. There are two reasonable theories for explaining budget slack： agency theory and contingency theory. At the same time, it is one important character in our transitional economics that state-owned enterprises are influenced administratively by the government. We select budgetary data from the enterprises listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen to research budget slack. Empirical results illuminate： 1. Ownership property, ownership structure and firm size are important expository variables for budget slack. Therefore, agency theory and government influence provide more explanation than contingency theory. 2. Tight budget does not have effective incentive effect, but improve manager＇s motivation to manage earnings.