论克里普克的后验必然命题与康德的先天综合命题

On Kripke's Necessary a Posteriori Propositions and Kant's Synthetic a Priori Propositions

克里普克的后验必然命题与康德的先天综合命题有相同的理论缘起,都起源于对归纳问题的思考,致力于解决经验科学知识的普遍必然性。克里普克论证后验必然命题的方法和康德证明先天综合命题的方法有相似之处。康德对先天综合命题的证明主要借助的是先验演绎的方法,夸大先验主观的一面。克里普克则是以可能世界语义理论和"名称是严格指示词"的先验直觉作为论证背景的。不过,克里普克的论证却是以反对康德观点开始的。康德和克里普克都没有从根本上解决经验科学知识的普遍必然性问题,但是他们的观点对于解决归纳问题有重要启示。

There is same origin that Kripke＇ s necessary a posteriori propositions and Kant＇ s synthetic a priori propositions, which originated in thinking on the problem of induction, for solving the problem that experiencing science knowledge is universally necessary. Nevertheless, Kripke＇ s method to demonstrate necessary a posteriori propositions is similar to Kant＇ s method to demonstrate synthetic a priori propositions. Kant＇s method is transcendental deduction, and he exaggerates the effect of transcendental subjectivity. Kripke＇ s demonstrative primes are semantics of possible worlds and name is rigid designator which is a sort of priori intuition. However, Kripke＇ s view is opposed to Kant＇ s. Both Kant and Kripke have not absolutely solved the problem that experiencing science knowledge is universally necessary. However, their views have important inspiring meaning on solving the problem of induction.