应诉费用与反倾销应诉行为选择分析——基于不能达成协议的Cournot模型

Analysis of Anti-dumping Litigation-Responding Fees and Behavior Choices Based on the Cournot Model without Agreements

文章以Cournot同质产品竞争模型为基础,建立了反倾销应诉费用内生化模型,分析了反倾销诉讼发起国企业(进口替代企业)与应诉企业(出口企业)的行为选择(假定两者不能达成协议)。表明应诉费用越高,即设置的应诉门槛越高,进口替代企业越有利。而对出口企业而言,则存在一个最佳应诉费用点,在其期望应诉费用未到达该最佳应诉费用点之前,越努力去应诉对自身越有利。在实践中,被提起反倾销诉讼的中国出口企业面临的应诉成本往往很高,超过了企业自身的期望成本和承受能力,导致出现不应诉或应诉不力的结果。

Based on the homogenous Cournot Model, this paper builds an endogenous antidumping Litigation- Responding fees model and analyzes the behavior choices of the import-substitute firm （petitioning firm） and the export firm （responding firm） under the circumstance of no reached agreement. The results drawn from the model show that： （Ⅰ） The higher the Litigation-Responding fee is, the more benefits the import-substitute firm can deserve; （Ⅱ） As for the export firm, there exits the best Litigation-Responding fees point. If the expected fee lies behind the best point, the export firm has great motivation to respond to the lawsuit and deserves more benefits. In practice, Chinese export firms often confront great Litigation-Responding fees burden, which exceeds the expected fees that they can afford, causing exporters＇ silence or fragility in AD lawsuits.