劳动保护中政府官员自利性官商勾结的解读

Interpretation of Government Officials' Self-serving Collusion with Businessmen in the Labor Protection

把劳动保护中官商勾结归结为政府整体本身基于发展观或者改善投资环境而采取的行为有可能被归咎于集体决策或者为了本地人民的福祉而免除处罚或者减轻处罚,其缺陷在于许多个人自利性的官商勾结也会隐藏在"发展观"或者"改善投资环境"的招牌下逃避处罚。文章通过对关系运作的阐述,可以构建自利性官商勾结的模型。分析表明影响政府官员个人性官商勾结的因素有:诚实工作的正常收益、行为被发现的概率、贴现因子、股份的多少,行为被发现以后的次优收益。结论认为只有提高违法成本,才能有效制止个人自利性官商勾结。

Ascribing the collusion between government officials and businessmen in the labor protection to unitary development view or the motivation of improving local investment environment and the welfare of local citizens may lead to the officials＂ being free from punishment or being slightly punished. Its limitation is that many selfserving collusions of between government officials and businessmen can be concealed under the signboard of development view or collective decision so as to escape punishment. By elucidating the cultivation of relationships, this paper establishes a model of self-serving collusion between government officials and businessmen. The analysis indicates that the factors influencing government officials＂ self-serving collusion with businessmen mainly include regular income after completing contracts honestly, probability of malefaction being discovered, discount factor, proportion of stock, sub-optimal income after malefaction being discovered. It is concluded that only by uplifting the transgression cost can the self-serving collusions of between government officials and businessmen be deterred.