基于信息不对称条件下的创业投资组合激励模型

The Incentive Model of Venture Capital Portfolio Based on the Conditions under Information Asymmetry

创业在经济发展中起着重要作用,创业投资家和创业企业家存在着委托代理关系。利用信息经济学有关理论构建了一个创业投资家和两个创业企业家之间的激励模型,以考察创业投资家将如何在不同的创业企业家之间设定激励水平,用委托代理的研究方法分析了创业投资家采取何种组合激励合约。研究结果表明,在存在多个创业企业家需要资金的情况下,创业投资家应对重要性更强和更愿意承担风险的创业企业家设定更高的激励水平。

Entrepreneurship in economic development plays an important role when there is a principal-agent relationship between the venture investors and entrepreneurs. Based on the information economics theory, we constructed an incentive model between one venture investor and two entrepreneurs in order to find out what levels of incentives that the former will give to the later and analyze what combination of incentives that the venture investor should set with principal-agent model. Research shows that the existence of many pioneering entrepreneurs need capital investment, venture investors should be able to identify the stronger cases and be more willing to bear the risks of entrepreneurship by setting higher levels of incentives.