关联方转移利益与盈余管理、大股东控制力关系研究

On the Relationship between Resources Diverted Away from Listed Companies by Related Parties and Earnings Management or Controlling Right of the Biggest Stockholder

文章选取2005年65家因关联交易获得非标准审计意见的上市公司作为样本,建立模型实证关联方转移利益与上市公司盈余管理程度和大股东控制力的关系。发现关联方转移利益与上市公司盈余管理程度、大股东控制力、股权分置改革、资产规模正相关。政策建议为:重点监管因关联交易获得非标准审计意见的上市公司;在深化股权分置改革时实行国有股缩股而不是只向流通股股东送股;实行累退投票制度;对股东大会决议的最低股权数做出决定,从而降低大股东的控制力。

This paper selects 65 listed companies which did not get standard auditing opinion because of related party transactions as samples of the year, 2005. By setting up regression model with four independent variabl , we verify the relationship between resources diverted away from listed companies by related parties and earnings management or controlling right of the biggest stockholder. This study has findings as follows： first, the resources being diverted away from listed companies by related parties are positive correlated with listed companies＇ earnings management, controlling right of the biggest stockholder and innovation of stock right; second, the resources being diverted away from listed companies by related parties are positive correlated with listed companies＇ assets size. On the basis of the findings, this paper puts forward suggestions on the relevant policy： first,we need regulate listed companies which did not get standard auditing opinion because of related party transactions with emphasis; second, we should reduce state＇s shareholding accompany of increasing current-shareholding when we reform shareholding＇s circulation problem and let all shares circulate; third, we may carry out the system of decrease progressively votes; fourth, we can provider the lowest percent of shares when shareholders resolute in shareholder＇s meeting.