摘要
本文研究开发了两阶段序列投资道德风险模型。基于价格和成本这两个影响R&D项目价值的关键因素,建立道德风险模型,并比较专有权、共同所有权和期权合同(Option Contract)三种R&D联盟组织结构,分别讨论结盟的两公司的投资决策及其投资的相互依赖性,和关键的协议参数对两公司最优投资水平的影响。并证明了期权合同组织结构占优于其他所有权组织结构。从而对期权合同近年来使用越来越多的原因给出了理论解释。
A two -period moral hazard model with the sequential investment in the R＆D alliance is studied. This moral hazard model is based on the price and cost that are two key factors affecting the R＆D value. The governance structures in R＆D alliance under exclusive or joint ownership and option contracts are analyzed and compared, the investment decisions of firm A and firm B, and the effect of key parameters on their first - best investment levels are discussed. Finally, it is proved that option contract strictly dominates other ownership structure. The results offer a theoretical explanation why partners in the R＆D alliance frequently use contingent ownership structures to govern their relationship, and why their initial arrangement is often modified over the time.
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第4期82-88,118,共8页
Science Research Management
基金
R&D联盟的期权博弈理论评估模型及实证研究。批准编号:70671047
研究期限:2007年1月至2009年12月
关键词
R&D联盟
道德风险
专有权
共同所有权
期权合同
R＆D alliance
moral hazard
exclusive ownership
joint ownership
option contract
