摘要
在企业集群组织中,由于企业之间的信息不对称是相互的,企业集群剩余的分配方式既不同于市场上以价格机制为基础的分配方式,也不同于企业内部以行政命令为基础的分配方式。通过建立基于博弈理论的企业集群剩余分配模型,指出集群内企业之间集群剩余的科学分配,可以使企业集群的总剩余达到最优;企业集群剩余的大小取决于集群内企业之间合作的有效性;集群剩余的最优分配比例取决于企业在企业集群组织中的相对重要性和企业之间约束的相对有效性。
Because of information asymmetry, the ways of residual distribution of enterprises cluster is not only different from the price mechanism that exists in the market, but it is not the same as the administerial order that exists in enterprise, Based on game theory, this paper built a model of residual distribution of enterprises cluster and made the following conclusions: Using scientific mechanism of residual distribution, the value of residual of enterprises cluster can reach its climax; The value of residual of enterprises cluster is depended on the linkage of each enterprise's contribution in the cluster; The proportion of residual distribution of each enterprise is depended on its own status and the validity of restriction in the cluster.
出处
《科学学与科学技术管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第9期108-113,共6页
Science of Science and Management of S.& T.
基金
山东省软科学研究计划项目(B2006066)阶段性研究成果
关键词
博弈理论
企业集群
集群剩余
game theory
enterprises cluster
residual of cluster