基于委托代理的供应链激励机制研究

Studies of incentive mechanism for supply chain enterprises based on principal-agent

信息不对称引起委托代理问题。供应链企业间由于信息不对称也存在着代理人的逆选择及道德风险等委托代理问题。为减少委托代理问题对供应链竞争力的影响,核心企业有必要运用信号传递机制优选代理人,通过建立激励机制实现对代理人的有效激励。

Information asymmetry causes principal-agent. There also exist such problems as agent＇s inverse choice and moral hazards because of information asymmetry among supply chain enterprises. To weaken the impact of principal-agent on competitive strength of supply chain, it is necessary for core enterprises to adopt signal transmission mechanism to optimize agents and to realize effective encouragement by establishing incentive mechanism.