存款保险制度由“隐”到“显”变革的博弈分析——基于大银行与中小银行间的公平竞争视角

The Game Theory Analysis on Reform of DIS from Implicit to Explicit:Based on the Equality Between Large Banks and Small-middle Banks

我国正走在从"隐性存款保险制度"转为"显性"的道路上。在这一过程中,较之大型商业银行而言,中小银行似乎更乐意接受这一变化。以往有部分研究谈及过这一问题,但未有考虑不完美信息这一限定条件者。针对这一状况,本文在不完美信息的假定下,基于成本收益的博弈模型论证了隐性存款保险安排下,大型银行与中小银行面临着不公平的竞争环境;进而,分析了从"隐性"到"显性"变革的必要性;最后,就显性安排下如何保障大银行和中小银行间的公平进行了探讨。

Many countries have chosen explicit DIS so as to protect the financial safety. China is under the reform from implicit DIS to explicit DIS. This process seems to he more likely to be accepted by the medium and small sized banks comparing to the big ones. With the hypothesis of imperfect information, the paper proves that under implicit DIS, big banks, medium and small hanks face unequal environments through the game theory analysis. Then it analyzes the necessity of the reform and gives some advice to keep the equality between two kinds of hanks under explicit DIS.