审计师选择、留存股权和盈余披露——中国IPO公司价值信号传递机制研究

Auditor Choice、 Retained Ownership and Earnings Disclosure——Research on Firm Value Signaling Mechanisms for IPO Firms in China

公司通过权衡信号成本与信息收益,选择一种或多种市场信号,包括审计师选择、留存股权和盈余披露等。各信号间的内生性问题是本文的研究重点。我们以2000—2002年中国155家IPO公司为研究样本,通过构建联立方程系统实证,发现:我国IPO市场审计师选择、盈余预测与留存股权并非替代信号,风险越大公司越倾向保留较低股权;盈利预测对股权留存并没有显著影响;审计收费对公司审计师选择具有显著影响,但审计风险对审计收费的影响并不明显。

Because of information asymmetries, firms are motivated to communicate their values information to the market by a variety of signaling mechanisms, including auditor choice, retained ownership and earnings disclosure. Based on data of the 155 IPOs over 2000 - 2002 in China, the paper examines the endogeneity of simultaneous equation. Findings indicate auditor reputation and retained ownership are not substitute signals. It is observed, as firm risk increases, entrepreneurs are more likely to retain higher ownership to signal firm value. In addition, earnings disclosure before IPO is associated with retained ownership significantly. And audit fee is associated with auditor choice significantly, but firm risk has no significant effect on auditor choice.