合约决策条件下的一种二层报童问题模型

A Bilevel Newsvendor Problem Model with Contract Decision-Making

考虑到顾客需求和市场价格具有高度的不确定性,供应商和零售商为了回避风险而达到最大的期望利润,双方通常可以采用签订合约的方式来进行决策。为此,我们建立了以供应商为领导层、零售商为从属层的具有合约决策的一个二层报童模型。供应商和零售商可以依据该模型的最优解通过谈判协商确定合约决策变量值以获取较高的期望利润。

A bilevel programming model for the newsvendor problem with contract decision-making is presented in this paper, in which the supplier is considered as the leader while the retailer is the follower. We also study the model＇ s effect when the supplier and retailer negotiate a contract. In order to obtain the maximal profit and avoid the risks that are caused by the uncertain market demand and market price, the supplier and the retailer prefer to sign purchase contract. The supplier and the retailer can compute the optimal contract decision variables by using model analysis, and the optimum solution can be obtained through the negotiation to gain higher expectation profit.