公司代理成本监督:一种法经济学的分析路径

On Supervision Mechanism of Company Agency Cost: an Approach of Legal Economics

以法律经济学以及契约理论为分析原点,一般认为现代公司制度,其实质上是一种复杂的委托代理关系。借助委托代理原理以及代理风险理论,对委托代理监管的必要性进行较为细致的经济分析,并通过聚焦于股东与董事会之间的内部代理关系,沿着监督强度逐步变化的轴向,以实证分析为工具,尝试构建一个"三分天下"的效率最优的上市公司代理人监督体系。

From the perspective of legal economics and contractual theory, the system of modern company normally would be considered as a sort of complex principal-agent relationship substantially. By means of the theories of principal-agent and agency hazards, the paper gives a comparatively meticulous economic analysis to the necessity of agency supervision. Then, following the axes of changing intension of supervision mechanism, I tried to construct an efficient supervision system of ＂fair share＂ for listed companies through focusing on the internal agency relationship between shareholder and director board and by the means of eases analysis.