摘要
工程建设中,业主、监理单位、施工单位三方追求的经济目标并不完全相同,为了追求自身经济利益,监理单位和施工单位有时可能进行合谋。运用了三方完全信息静态博弈的防共谋均衡理论,对此类问题进行了分析,得出应将监理公司的既得利益与工程总体质量进行更紧密的挂钩,并在可能的情况下用行政方式增加监理单位共谋的成本的建议,使监理单位更充分地发挥其应有的效能。
In project construction ,the economic goals of the owner, supervision company and construction company are not always the same. Sometimes the supervision company and the construction company may collude together to pursur their own maximal ceonomic bencfits. This article analyzes this problem with the coalition-proof analysis in tripartite complete information statie games. and the conclusion is that the benefit of the supervision company shall be more tightly combined with the project quality, and the govemmental measures shall be taken under possible conditions to increase the colluding cost of the superision company so as to greatly improve the function of supervision activities.
出处
《山东科技大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
2008年第4期94-98,共5页
Journal of Shandong University of Science and Technology(Natural Science)
关键词
博弈论
完全信息静态博弈
工程管理
防共谋均衡
game thcory
complete information static game
project management
coalition-proof equilibrium
