期刊文献+

房地产开发商声誉与客户预期动态博弈研究 被引量:3

Dynamic Game between the Reputation of Real Estate and Customer Expectation
下载PDF
导出
摘要 通过对Barro和Vickers模型加以变形,应用不完全信息动态博弈的研究方法,在理性预期的假设前提下,通过建立房地产开发商与购房者的行为博弈模型,研究房地产开发商声誉对于近期某些城市所发生的退房潮的影响。结论是在一定的制度安排下,良好的房地产开发商声誉有助于引导购房者形成有利的预期,减少退房的发生,因此对房地产开发商来说,建立一个强的企业声誉至关重要。 Based on the transformation of Barro and Vickers model, with the research method of incomplete information dynamic game theory, the paper proposed a game theory model between the real estate developers and buyers under the hypothesis of rational expectations. The model was used to research the influence of reputation of real estate developer on the influx of check-out recently occurred in some cities. The conclusion is that in a certain institutional arrangement, a good reputation of the real estate developers will help guide buyers to t:onn expectation and reduce the incidence of check-out. So a good reputation of real estate developers will be very important.
作者 王军 聂规划
出处 《武汉理工大学学报》 CAS CSCD 北大核心 2008年第9期151-153,161,共4页 Journal of Wuhan University of Technology
关键词 房地产开发商声誉 客户预期 不完全信息动态博弈 reputation of real estate developers customer expectation incomplete information dynamic game
  • 相关文献

参考文献4

二级参考文献24

  • 1Alan D. Morrison and William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Partnership Firms, Reputation, and Human Capital, January 24, 2003.
  • 2Bengt Holmstrom, Managerial Incentive Problems-A Dynamic Perspective, NBER working paper 6875,1999.
  • 3David Kreps, Paul IL Miigrom, D. John Roberts, and Robert Wilson. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 27:245-252,1982.
  • 4David M. Krepe and Robert Wilson. Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory, 27:253-279,198Z.
  • 5David M. Kreps. Corporate culture and economic theory.In James E. Ah and Kenneth A. Shepsle, editor, Perspective on Positive Political Economy, Pages 90-143. Cambridge University Press,Carsbirdge, 1990.
  • 6Diamond, D., "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Market".Journal of Political Economy, 97 (4) : 828-862,1989.
  • 7Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine. Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed. Rewiew of Economic studies, 59:561-579,1992.
  • 8George J. Mailath and Larry. Samuelaon, Your Reputation is Who You're not, Not Who You'd Like To Be, CARESS Working Paper 98-11,1998.
  • 9George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Who Wants a Good Reputation, Review of Economic Studies 68, P.415-441. 2001.
  • 10John Kennes and Aaron Schiff, The Value of a Reputation System, Economies Working Paper Archive at WUSTL.2002.

共引文献107

同被引文献21

引证文献3

二级引证文献1

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部