地方政府投资中的冲动与拖延--中国经济过热的一个行为经济学解释

The Impulse and Procrastination in the Investments of Local Governments:——An Explanation of the Overheating of Chinese Economy from the Viewpoint of Behavior Economics

我国地方政府由于任期制等原因而形成"短视"认知偏差,过分注重项目的短期收益状况,从而会表现出对能带来大量即期收益的"政绩工程"类项目的投资冲动和对需要大量即期成本支付的环保类项目的投资拖延。以此可以部分地解析地方政府过度投资在我国历次经济过热中的作用机制。绿色GDP的提倡和一票否决制度作为中央政府对地方政府投资的反偏差干预手段,也可在此框架内得到统一的逻辑解释。

Chinese local governments, due to reasons such as the tenure system and so on, form the myopia cognitive bias, which attach excessive importance to the short -term revenue of projects, so it can be seen that local governments＇impulse to invest in projects which can bring a large amount of immediate revenue and procrastination in such constructions as environment protection that needs a great deal of immediate cost payment. Therefore the effect mechanism of excessive investment of China＇s local governments in the past overheating of Chinese economy can be partly explained. The call for green GDP and the one ballot veto system, serving as a debias intervention measure by the central government, can also be explained in consistent logic under this framework.